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This conference, organized under the UNRISD project
on Technocratic Policy Making and Democratiza-
tion, was held to discuss the constraints faced by new
democracies as they become increasingly integrated into
the world market. The conference attracted about 80
participants, drawn from international agencies, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), the diplomatic
community and academic institutions.
Eighteen scholars and practitioners led discussions in
four sessions: independent authorities and democratic
accountability; economic reforms, democratization and
social policy; civil society and technocratic governance;
and economic policy making and parliamentary account-
ability. There was an opening keynote address focusing
on financial globalization and democratization, and a
closing keynote address on ways of strengthening demo-
cratic institutions in the era of globalization.
Democracy or Technocracy?
Since the early 1990s, there has been a strong wave of
democratization in most regions of  the world. Most
surveys on democratization record a sharp rise in the
number of  countries that can now be classified as
democratic, even though the quality of  democratic in-
stitutions is uneven across countries. Issues of  repre-
sentation, accountability and transparency have
become prominent on the agendas of  citizen groups
concerned with sound government and equitable de-
velopment. Indeed, many international agencies now
associate participation in decision making with effec-
tive public policies.
However, the global trend in democratization is being
challenged by another trend that is gathering strength
with globalization: the increasingly technocratic style that
seems to inform the making of  economic policy in many
countries and in multilateral economic institutions gen-
erally. Financial globalization and the dominance of
neoliberal ideas in multilateral financial institutions and
the G-7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, the United Kingdom and the United States) are
narrowing the choices in economic policy making to a
limited set of  objectives. Described in some circles as
the Washington Consensus, these objectives can be
summarized as conservative fiscal policies, privatization,
and open trade and capital accounts, all of  which re-
flect an acceptance of  price stability as the primary con-
cern of  macroeconomic policy.
Pressure to standardize macroeconomic objectives en-
courages governments to restrict policy making to ex-
perts and insulate key economic institutions from
democratic scrutiny. This may affect democratization
in two ways. First, it may distort the structure of  ac-
countability by encouraging national authorities to be
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more responsive to financial markets and multilateral
institutions than to fledgling parliaments and citizens.
Second, social policies, which were crucial in consoli-
dating Western democracies, may be treated as residuals
of  macroeconomic policy, and democratization that
does not conform to neoliberal economic orthodoxy
dismissed as populism.
In his introductory remarks, Thandika Mkandawire
warned of  the dangers of  these developments for the
consolidation of  democratic institutions. If  citizens lose
faith in the capacity of newly established democratic
institutions to act as legitimate platforms for decisions
that affect their lives, they may be tempted to question
the value of  democracy and seek solutions elsewhere.
However, as Sylvia Maxfield argued in her keynote
speech, the links between technocratic policy making
and democracy are not always conflictual. She addressed
the complex ways different types of  international in-
vestors influence the policy choices of  governments and
the consolidation of democratic institutions in emerg-
ing markets. The time horizons and preferences of  for-
eign direct investors and stockholders may be different
from those of  commercial banks and bondholders, who
seek high interest rates, conservative fiscal policies, and
central bank independence.
International investors may act as a constraint on demo-
cratic institutions: when capital moves in and out of
countries in volatile ways; when investors force policy
makers in developing economies to raise interest rates
to levels that will mirror changes in those of  the ad-
vanced economies; and when developing countries can-
not adopt reflationary policies in periods of  recession
for fear of  provoking capital flight.
Investors whose choices encourage capital volatility are
more likely to be bondholders than direct investors or
stockholders. However, there are different types of
bondholders: those who plan to hold the bond to ma-
turity and those who do not; mutual fund managers who
must redeem their capital on a quarterly basis and, thus,
tend to have short-term horizons; hedge fund manag-
ers who tend to invest when bond prices are low; and
local pension and insurance companies who invest with
a long-term horizon.
Maxfield argued that changes in the structure of  capital
may help strengthen democratic institutions in several
ways. First, trends toward liberalized bond and equity
markets may undermine oligopolistic corporate struc-
tures and make credit available to more groups of  in-
vestors, with recent developments in Internet technology
leading to a democratization of  capital markets. Sec-
ond, efforts by investors to overcome information de-
ficiencies may lead to demands for transparency in public
policies, reliable financial reporting and strong regula-
tory institutions. These are likely to have spillover ef-
fects on political institutions, such as election offices,
the judiciary and lawmaking bodies.
A fruitful way of  conceptualizing the links between
democratization and technocracy would thus be to de-
velop a spectrum along which cases of  democracy and
technocracy can be distributed. One end of  the spec-
trum might be cases in which technocratic styles of
policy making undermine a countrys democratic in-
stitutions; the other end might be cases in which fi-
nancial transparency, professionalism and the rule of
law associated with current technocratic policy-making
styles help to consolidate democratic institutions, albeit
in a neoliberal direction.
Maxfields examples from Mexicowhere investors
supported a more plural Congress in the elections of
1997 as a condition for continued investmentand
presentations on Chile and Argentinawhere demo-
cratic institutions are being consolidated despite the
legacy of  technocratic styles of  policy makingrein-
force the usefulness of  this approach. Most countries
are likely to fall between the extremes of  democracy
and technocracy on the continuum.
Independent Authorities
and Democratic Accountability
There is a growing trend to create autonomous public
authorities that will check the discretionary powers of
governments in key areas of  policy making. One set of
these institutions includes central banks, finance and
trade ministries, tax administration offices, and execu-
tive agencies in service delivery. A second set includes
independent courts, electoral bodies and ombudsmen.
Although they share some characteristics in the pro-
motion of  horizontal forms of  accountability, the two
sets of  institutions are different. The first group may
make policies that impact differently on social groups
and individuals, while the second group is more likely
to place constraints on behaviour than to allocate re-
sources or opportunities. In other words, there are often
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hard choices to be made in the areas where new inde-
pendent authorities are gaining influence.
Those who advance the case for central bank inde-
pendence believe that bankers are more likely than poli-
ticians to develop the long-term horizon that monetary
policy requires to stabilize the price level. There are
also increasing calls to set up independent fiscal au-
thorities to check the propensity of  governments or
politicians to manipulate tax policies during the elec-
toral cycle. Independent fiscal authorities would enjoy
flexibility in adjusting tax rates according to the busi-
nessnot electoralcycle. Technocratic approaches
to making economic policy may affect the way gov-
ernments respond to the concerns of  citizens and
elected representatives on such issues as employment,
social protection and poverty eradication.
Three cases of  independent authorities were discussed.
The first was the experience of  the European Central
Bank (ECB). Robert Elgie highlighted two sets of  indi-
ces for measuring the ECBs independence: political
independence and economic independence, which,
among other issues, address questions of  tenure, ap-
pointment, decision-making powers and the freedom
to determine monetary policy. On the basis of  scores
obtained from his methodology, Elgie concluded that
the ECB is highly independent.
However, he pointed out that despite its independ-
ence, the ECB has taken steps to make its operations
transparent. It makes quarterly reports to the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP); its executive board appears be-
fore the EP at various intervals; it invites dialogue with
members of  the EPs committee on economic and
monetary affairs; its president and vice-presidents hold
monthly press conferences; it has a Web site that at-
tracts 2,0004,000 hits per week; and it has offered a
quantitative definition of  price stability, even though
it is not obliged to do so under the treaty that estab-
lished its rules of  engagement.
Elgie argued that despite these developments, the ECB
is still a fundamentally unaccountable institution.
Transparency, though important, is not a sufficient con-
dition for accountability, which denotes capacity to
hold policy makers responsible for their actions. How-
ever, in suggesting ways of  closing the ECBs demo-
cratic deficit, he advocated behavioural rather than
structural changes. Structural changes, which would
involve changing the Maastricht Treaty on monetary
union, are likely to endanger the credibility of  the ECB
and the European Union (EU) project. Behavioural
changes would diminish, not eliminate, the deficit. This
would involve raising awareness among ECB officials
about the need for policy goals beyond price stability,
and improving the dialogue between the ECB and
elected bodies and representatives, such as the EP and
EU finance ministers.
The second case of  independent authorities concerns
Japans experience in using insulated bureaucracies to
support policies that have helped transform it into an
economic giant. Junko Kato described the institutional
structure of  this technocracy. The Ministry of  Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) exercised enormous
influence on industrial policy making through adminis-
trative guidance, subsidies, research support, and licens-
ing arrangements. The Ministry of  Finance enjoyed
strong regulatory powers in the financial domain.
The Bank of  Japan (BOJ), meanwhile, occupied a pe-
culiar place in the technocratic set-up. Rapid growth
and industrialization required hard choices to be made
on key macroeconomic policies. For instance, govern-
ment officials preferred an easing of  the money supply
and lower interest rates, whereas the BOJ, worried about
the external pressures on the yen, preferred tighter con-
trol of  monetary policy and an adjustable yen. Con-
flicts over these issues explain the lack of  independence
of  the BOJ and the governments strong influence in
its operations: the head of  the BOJ is recruited alterna-
tively from the Ministry of  Finance and BOJ; and be-
fore the recent reforms, the BOJs policy consultation
committee included two government representatives.
Kato argued that the revision of  the BOJ law has not
led to a more independent bank.
She contrasted Japans technocracy with more conven-
tional types. Japans bureaucrats enter the ministries
with a bachelors degree, and after several years of  work
are given an opportunity to study abroad. Unlike other
technocracies that recruit external experts, Japanese
bureaucrats develop expertise on the job: they are so-
cialized into the worldview of  the bureaucracy. Most
Japanese bureaucrats believe in government interven-
tion to assist market development. Kato argued that
as democratic practices become consolidated, Japanese
politicians gain more influence in economic policy mat-
ters but do not seriously undermine the power of  the
technocratic elite. This is because of  the low levels of
expertise available to political parties and the legisla-
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ture. She concluded that the outcomes of  the bureau-
cratic reforms spawned by the recession of  the 1990s
are still uncertain.
The third presentation on independent authorities was
by Ole Therkildsen, who discussed new public man-
agement (NPM) reform and the growth of  executive
agencies, using Uganda and Tanzania as case studies.
NPM reform has three key doctrines: improvement of
public sector accountability; freedom of  managers to
manage; and empowerment of  consumers. It calls for
performance targets and contracts to help politicians
hold bureaucrats accountable; and separation of  the
tasks of  policy making from service delivery, which
becomes the responsibility of  executive agencies.
Therkildsen reported that there are plans to create 47
executive agencies in Tanzania and 100 in Uganda. The
service delivery functions of  ministries and local gov-
ernments will be transferred to semi-autonomous serv-
ice boards. The boards will not be democratically
elected, but appointed by the ministers. Donors sup-
port for democratization and decentralization is con-
tradicted by their funding of  reforms that make service
boards unaccountable to elected bodies. At the village
level in Tanzania, a pilot project is being sponsored by
the World Bank to turn primary schools into execu-
tive agencies. Each school will be run by committees,
parents will pay half  the cost of  their childrens edu-
cation in cash to the bank account of  their preferred
school, there will be a contract between the schools
and the ministry to improve examination scores and
enrolment, and parents will have the choice to change
schools as they deem necessary.
Therkildsen noted that the public sector reforms have
been driven by donors, whose interests are integrated
into the policy-making and budgetary processes of  re-
cipient countries. This has skewed accountability in fa-
vour of  external forces. He questioned the uncritical
application of NPM in countries with fragile democra-
cies and weak institutions. He argued that the creation
of  executive agencies is based on the questionable
premise that performance is an unambiguous concept,
which can be measured objectively. However, where
there is no politically agreed framework or consensus
for measuring performance, adoption of  performance
contracts may encourage open conflicts and more pro-
nounced distrust of  government. The political costs of
enforcing contracts may be high, forcing politicians to
refuse to enforce them.
Discussion
Several participants questioned the assumed trade-off
between institutional independence and accountability,
and warned of  the dangers of  accountability leading to
overpoliticization of  service delivery. Elgie replied that
it is possible to make institutions both relatively inde-
pendent and accountable. He gave the example of  New
Zealands independent central bank, which operates
within certain parameters that make it possible to hold
the bank accountable if  targets are not met. However,
he argued that there are no comparable sanction mecha-
nisms for holding the ECB accountable. He concluded
that an uncritical transfer of successful institutions from
one country to another may be undesirable since social
and political systems are different.
One participant raised the issue of  whether social com-
mitments can be accommodated in the organizational
culture of  the Japanese bureaucracy. This was followed
by comments on the increasing role of  politicians and
civil society groups in influencing the behaviour of
Japans bureaucrats, as well as the role of  globaliza-
tion in weakening MITIs regulatory capacity in the
industrial sector.
Kato reiterated the distinction between expertise-based
bureaucracies and the Japanese type of  bureaucracy,
which stresses internal socialization. It is not clear which
is, or can be made to be, more accountable to society.
She felt that although there has been more pluralism in
Japan, distrust of  political parties and the bureaucracy
has grown. On the issue of  globalization, industrial regu-
lation and competition, she argued that even though
trade barriers have been abolished, there is societal sus-
picion of  foreign goods, which acts as an informal tar-
iff. The recession has also helped Japan to resist demands
from trading partners for more openness.
Comments were made by several people on the con-
tradictory strategies of  donors in supporting both top-
down public sector management reforms and
decentralization. One participant argued that the con-
tradiction could be better understood if donor sup-
port for autonomous service boards is seen as an effort
to maximize donor influence and secure favourable
results in the sectors in which they intervene. Another
participant called attention to the questionable results
of  NPM methods in school systems in the United
States and the need to avoid their hasty implementa-
tion in developing countries. In his response,
Therkildsen remarked that different sections of  donor
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and recipient institutions enter into different coalitions,
and that there is often less co-ordination of policies
among agencies and recipient country institutions.
Economic Reforms,
Democratization and Social Policy
Technocratic policy making can also be observed in the
social field. Recent trends in democratization suggest that
democracies that do not address the social well-being of
citizens may be prone to instability. Citizens may associ-
ate democratization with enhanced spending on educa-
tion, health, social security and poverty reduction
schemes. There is strong evidence in studies on public
finance and electoral politics that pressures for increased
public expenditure tend to mount during electoral cy-
cles as politicians seek re-election. Indeed, one reason
private property holders were opposed to the universal
franchise in advanced economies was the belief  that the
propertyless majority would use its numerical power in
elections to promote redistributive policies in its favour.
One enigma of  democratic theory and practice is that
the fear of  redistribution has not occurred with any sig-
nificance in new democracies. Recent explanations for
this include the problems of  collective action; the mul-
tiple, rather than single, issue-focused interests of  vot-
ers; ethnic and other competing loyalties; and the
internalization by the poor of  the institutions of  pri-
vate property rights. In addition, redistributive pressures
may conflict with the residual and targeted social poli-
cies that technocrats may favour as they seek to control
expenditures, meet multilateral loan obligations, and
attract private capital. One disturbing trend is the seem-
ingly weak performance of  governments in new democ-
racies in reducing poverty.
Session chairperson Stefanie Grant emphasized the
growing links between human rights and development,
and the need to adopt a rights-based approach to con-
structing the political framework that Therkildsen dis-
cussed as essential for measuring good performance in
service delivery. Central to this approach is the need for
multilateral and national institutions to develop norma-
tive indicators of  rights in their frameworks of  analysis
and development programmes.
The first speaker on the panel, Maureen Mackintosh,
examined the costs of  technocratic styles of  regulation
in health care delivery systems. Drawing on joint work
with Paula Tibandebage, Mackintosh noted the multi-
ple conceptual meanings of  technocratic policy mak-
ing. It can refer to a process of  decision making in which
technocratic groups are insulated from external pres-
sures; it can mean the content of  the policy, which is
determined by rules that do not engage the context in
which the policy is to be applied; and it can denote a
separation of  policy making from implementation, in
which there is a failure to recognize the interactions of
process and content. Mackintosh employed all three
senses of  the concept in contrasting Tanzanias techno-
cratic approaches in health care regulation with more
collaborative methods that seem to offer greater pros-
pects for sustainable health care delivery.
Economic crisis and liberalization in the 1990s produced
major problems for users of  Tanzanias health sector:
high fees; social exclusion; erosion of  exemption mecha-
nisms for vulnerable patients; overprescription and use
of  expired drugs; misdiagnosis; and patient-managed
referral practices. Tanzanias regime of  health sector gov-
ernance emphasized rule setting and monitored com-
pliance. But the government lacked the resources for
effective monitoring and control; some of  its interven-
tions created perverse incentives for health care provid-
ers and users; and it was unable to relate with the diverse
actors that its policy of liberalization had created.
Mackintosh suggested an alternative regime of  regula-
tion, which emphasized collaboration among govern-
ment, private and non-governmental health care
providers, and the public. She questioned the targeting
model of  residual health care for the poorest, and ar-
gued instead for inclusiveness of  the system as a whole.
Her alternative strategy accepted the diversity that has
emerged from liberalization, and called for better com-
petition to undermine bad providers, more collabora-
tion among professionals and institutions to make the
health market function better, and institutionalization of
negotiations to encourage providers to see the rules as
legitimate. In Mackintoshs approach, co-providers would
also become co-regulators, and the public would play an
active role in governing both government and private
sector providers. The government would continue, how-
ever, to perform its responsibilities in rule making.
Abdul Raufu Mustapha discussed the larger question
of  poverty, economic reforms and democratization, and
why African governments have not been able to deliver
their populations from poverty despite the connections
voters tend to make between democratization and wel-
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fare. Mustapha linked democratization with citizens dis-
enchantment with adjustment programmes, which re-
versed gains made in the social sectors of  many countries
in the 1960s and 1970s.
Economic crisis and adjustment increased the informal-
ization of  the economy, and widened the gaps between
rulers and the poor that were already becoming evident
in the 1970s as leaders abandoned the welfare objectives
of  the anticolonial struggles. According to Mustapha,
the poor embraced democratization in the 1990s as an
opportunity to redress socioeconomic decline. The
World Bank, on the other hand, tried to depoliticize
democracy, first by reducing it to governance, and then
by reducing governance to technical institutional con-
ditions that are necessary for successful adjustment: the
rule of  law, transparency and accountability.
Mustapha cited recent studies that suggest that democ-
ratization does not always promote accountability, nor
raise human development; and that there is no strong
correlation between decentralization, empowerment and
pro-poor policies. Using a Nigerian case study, he high-
lighted the ways adjustment policies and military rule
increased social differentiation within, and fragmented
the ideological and electoral unity of, the peasantry. This
peasantry was the backbone for radical politics in that
region during decolonization and much of  the inde-
pendence period. However, powerful urban patrons
have replaced local political organizations as the driv-
ing force of  politics. The peasantry had fewer resources
to articulate its concerns when democratization emerged
in the late 1990s. Despite these problems, Mustapha
concluded that democracy is the only weapon of  the
poor to improve its welfare.
Patricio Silva discussed the Latin American experience.
Perhaps more than any other region in the developing
world, Latin America has experienced a structured form
of  policy making that privileges a narrow circle of  eco-
nomic policy elites who are highly sensitive to the dy-
namics of  international financial markets. Silva advanced
several reasons for the rise of  technocrats in Latin
America: stabilization programmes, the waning influ-
ence of  left-wing parties, and the association of
populism with military dictatorship and hyperinflation.
Under democratization, policy makers are worried about
a repoliticization of  the social question.
According to Silva, technocratic decision making has
resulted in the technification of  social and political
problems. In other words, poverty and social inequali-
ties have been transformed into technical terms, with
emphasis on targeting and safety nets, even though gov-
ernments are not sufficiently equipped to handle the
tasks. There are increasing demands for expertise in the
social sector. However, there is less participation in the
administration of  targeted social programmes, with the
World Bank and national technocrats setting the agenda
and maintaining overall control. Silva reported that
NGOs are also incorporating technocratic management
styles in their operations as they become dependent on
multilateral agencies and the state for funds.
Discussion
The discussion focused on issues of  informality and
corruption, problems of  targeting the social sector, and
participation. One participant raised the question of  the
criminalization of  informal economies, and the effects
this has on poverty and democratization in Africa.
Mustapha commented that informalization is important;
although in his study of  five major agricultural zones in
Nigeria, he found that most informal households were
not accumulating capital but coping with stresses ema-
nating from the macroeconomy. Not all informal ac-
tivities are criminal, and countries differ in the extent
of  penetration of  criminal activities in their social sys-
tems; and criminalization is not more serious in Africa
than in other regions.
Mackintosh reinforced the point that some informal
economic activities are benign and others are not. Peo-
ple in the health sector make clear distinctions between
different forms of  informal prices or charges. For in-
stance, there is a difference between abusive bribes
and payments perceived to help the local dispenser. Both
are illegal, but people see them differently. The latter
reflects a set of  informal rules that can be formalized.
One comment called for a distinction to be made be-
tween the words technocratic and technical. Tech-
nical competence is required in policy making even if
society and elected institutions are involved in the policy
process. Another comment highlighted the contradic-
tory positions of  the multilateral funding agencies in
targeting industrial and social sectors. The World Bank,
for instance, is against industrial targeting on efficiency
grounds, but supports it in the social sector. There are
information, administrative, monitoring and selection
problems in targeting. Hence, it was asked why target-
ing should be seen by development agencies and gov-
ernments as difficult and undesirable in the industrial
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sector, but possible and desirable in the more complex
social sector.
Silva responded that under a technocratic regime, targets
are more important than participation or the methods
used to arrive at the targets. He agreed that targeting in
the social sector is a big problem. He argued that if the
poor make up only 20 per cent of  the population, as in
Chile, some amount of  targeting may work; but target-
ing is impossible if  60 per cent of  the population is poor.
The biggest problems in Latin America are absence of
good data, poor resources and weak capacity for evalua-
tion. Business and governments prefer targeting because
it is less costly to them than universal programmes.
Civil Society and
Technocratic Governance
The next panel focused on civil society groups, whose
participation in policy making has long been recognized
as essential for democratic accountability. However, glo-
balization is affecting the participation of  these groups
in economic policy making. For instance, the govern-
ance roles of labour in macroeconomic policy making
in countries with tripartite institutions are being ques-
tioned on the basis of  the need to promote labour mar-
ket flexibility, higher productivity and price stability. And
decision making in key multilateral economic institutions
often excludes civil society groups. Furthermore, this
process of  exclusion is ambiguous. NGOs and unions
are fighting back and resisting technocracy. Social pacts,
concertation and partnership, involving unions,
other civic groups, employers, the state and multilateral
economic institutions, are increasingly on the agenda.
The first presentation, by Robert OBrien, examined ef-
forts by civil society groups to influence decision mak-
ing in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
OBrien highlighted three factors that have made tech-
nocracy important in international relations. The first is
the growth of  functionalism as a strategy for minimiz-
ing conflicts between states and building co-operation
within international organizations. Functionalism
stresses the value of  working on uncontroversial tech-
nical issues as a condition for tackling contentious ones.
The second factor is the increasingly technical nature
of  the world economy, whose governance requires high
levels of  expertise. And the third relates to the way pow-
erful actors use technocratic management of  public
policy to depoliticize distributive issues. He established
a connection between functionalism, technocracy and
the new constitutionalism, which seeks to remove
more areas of  public life from democratic scrutiny. He
argued that the exclusion of  social groups from the
governance of  international institutions can create
pathologiessuch as delegitimization, violent resistance,
and ineffective policy implementation.
OBrien discussed three types of  civil society groups
that are trying to engage the multilateral economic in-
stitutions: those that support the neoliberal agenda of
the economic institutions; those that seek to reform
that agenda through emphasis on social issues and par-
ticipation; and those that call for a complete overhaul
of  the international institutions. He contended that
the more powerful an institution is, the less likely it
would be to welcome civil society participation; and
the less social an institutions mandate, the less likely
that it would provide for participation.
He constructed a participation pyramid that places in-
stitutions like the International Labour Organization
(ILO), United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, United Nations Childrens Fund and World
Health Organization at the base, the World Bank in
the middle, and the IMF and WTO at the top. He ar-
gued that the closer an institution gets to the pinnacle
of  economic power, the less scope there is for non-
technocrats to play a role in policy making. In general,
it is difficult to change the policy-making styles of  mul-
tilateral institutions because of  the lack of  integration
between policy areas, and the advantage that concern
for efficiency enjoys over other social values.
The other two presentations focused on labour unions and
policy making in national settings. Björn Beckman pro-
vided a comparative analysis of  the efforts of  industrial
unions to influence policy making in eight countries through
the medium of  social pacts. He argued that unions can
constitute a counterweight of  society to technocratic policy
making. Despite falling membership, declining incomes and
welfare support, there is evidence that working-class or-
ganizations have grown in strength in some countries.
His cases reveal mixed results. In South Africa, union
influence has dramatically increased. In the Republic
of  Korea, there is a cautious but increasing engagement
with the state. In Mexico, there is a serious struggle to
recreate corporatist arrangements associated with one-
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party rule. In Venezuela, a new government seeks to
challenge the corporatist order by restructuring unions.
In Malaysia, there is a tendency to strengthen negoti-
ated relationships at the company level, which may af-
fect unions increasing autonomy.
According to Beckman, unions efforts to influence
public policies are linked to their ability to develop or-
ganizational strength and rights in the workplace. He
argued that the main source of  union power in the new
global order is not the formation of  new pacts, but the
successful challenging and disintegration of  existing
ones. The process of  increasing union autonomy also
questions authoritarian rule at the political level. The
most obvious cases are South Africa and the Republic
of  Korea. He concluded that union contestation should
not be seen simply as a question of  providing a coun-
terweight to technocracyit is also about deciding
whose technocrats should be in charge of policy making.
The third presentation, by Alan Leather, examined the
responses of  public sector workers to the economic policy
reforms of  the 1980s and 1990s. Public sector workers
are among the groups that have borne the major costs
of  adjustment, through job losses, reduced income and
social benefits, and unstable working conditions. Leather
stated that unions were not consulted when neoliberal
adjustment programmes were implemented in the 1980s
and early 1990s. The reforms had six main effects on
public sector unions: declining membership and revenue;
weakening of  labour legislation that supports workers
rights; dismissal of  trade unions voice on policy issues
as collectivist; gender bias; increased pressure from rank-
and-file members on union leaders to protect workers;
and development of  new skills by union leaders in deal-
ing with the social consequences of  the reforms.
Leather noted that Public Service Internationals (PSI)
criticisms of  the reforms have helped improve dialogue
with the World Bank. PSI commented on drafts of  the
Banks World Development Report 1997 on the state,
which recognized unions as social partners. It also par-
ticipated in discussions on privatization and offered
seminars to World Bank staff  on unions and workers
welfare. Recently, PSI, the International Transport Fed-
eration and the World Bank established a joint secre-
tariat to monitor and encourage labour participation in
the privatization of  public enterprises.
However, the value to workers of  dialogue with multi-
lateral institutions will ultimately depend on whether
policy makers adopt a trade union perspective on reform
of  the international financial architecture. Leather called
for the adoption of policies that will address the prob-
lems of  poor countries and marginal groups; expansion
of  global demand to generate jobs; more regulation of
the international financial system; and incorporation of
the ILOs Declaration of  Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work into policy and programme development
strategies of  countries and institutions.
Discussion
There was a lively debate on union-government rela-
tions, labour and environmental standards in trade rela-
tions, and the North-South and union-NGO divides
on these issues. One participant questioned the cur-
rent value of  social pacts as globalization, fiscal crises
and informalization of  economies weaken govern-
ments credibility to make tangible deals with unions,
and erode unions capacities to protect members. An-
other person contended that experiences in Western
Europewhere social pacts are being revivedmay
signal the end of neoliberalism and possibilities for
promoting more inclusive government-union relations
in developing countries.
Beckman replied that the picture of  loss of  union
power is complex. Unions are gaining political strength
in many developing countries even when their indus-
trial strength is being eroded. He argued that the hol-
lowing of  social pacts simultaneously creates a need
for governments to rein in labour, which is potentially
disruptive. Labour may be unable to impose its agenda,
but it still has the capacity to obstruct policies. For
instance, governments in many petroleum-producing
countries have found it difficult to withdraw subsidies
from petroleum products; and union leaders are play-
ing active roles in political movements for democrati-
zation. Leather felt that there is certainly a trend in the
EU to involve unions in a collaborative way in the con-
struction of  the European project, but it is not certain
whether this signals an era of  fruitful government-
labour relations in developing countries.
Some commentary focused on the need to see top civil
servants as part of  the technocratic elite; and to rec-
ognize the increasing union-NGO divide on develop-
ment issues. For instance, corporations are asking
Northern NGOs to monitor compliance with labour
standards in developing countries, thus by-passing in-
stitutions such as the ILO and unions. Leather re-
sponded that senior civil servants are difficult to
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unionize because of their ambiguous positions as su-
pervisors and workers. In fact, they do not have trade
union rights in a number of  countries. However, he
believed that their behaviour as technocrats may dif-
fer from one country to the other.
Leather stated that Northern NGOs should recognize
the existence of unions in the countries where they
operate, in order to encourage fruitful co-operation
between the two groups. There is a trade union fear
that the work NGOs attract to developing countries
may undermine workers jobs in similar activities, such
as in the health sector. He argued that NGOs often talk
about basic rights without reference to unions, and do
not encourage their workers to unionize. Their accept-
ance of  contracts to monitor labour standards may ham-
per labour-NGO relations. Unions should play leading
roles in monitoring labour standards.
One comment, which elicited responses from all panel-
lists, addressed the media perception of  unions as pro-
tectionist, especially over negotiations leading to the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the WTO meeting
in Seattle. OBrien responded that the unity of  civil soci-
ety groups in Seattle was fragile: there were conflicts be-
tween organized unions and other groups, as well as within
each group. He argued that the role of  unions is to pro-
tect workers by taking them out of  competition. He com-
mented that the international regime seems more willing
to use sanctions to protect the property rights of  corpo-
rations than the labour rights of  workers.
Beckman responded that Seattle was successful from
the point of  view of  civic resistance because of  the
backbone labour unions provided to a wide coalition
of  groups. Many Third World unions played active roles,
which undermined the nationalist arguments of  their
governments, which tried to separate labour issues from
trade negotiations. Leather, though, felt that the Seattle
agenda was stolen by some groups for their own ends.
However, he argued that the social clause that was cham-
pioned by unions had nothing to do with protection-
ism, as it was concerned with labour rights and working
conditions. The protectionist behaviour of  a few un-
ions in the North should not be used to discredit the
legitimate claims of  the labour movement as a whole.
He also stated that high levels of  unemployment in the
North are not caused by free trade.
Leather described attacks on unions over calls for sanc-
tions to implement labour standards in trade relations
as a red herring: workers have borne the brunt of
conditionality, or sanctions, in adjustment pro-
grammes, and have been fighting to defend the la-
bour rights that these programmes have undermined.
He concluded that the same forces that have been
quick to use sanctions in economic reform pro-
grammes to punish labour, are at the forefront of  ac-
cusing labour of  supporting sanctions to enforce
labour rights in trade relations.
Eddy Lee, the chair of  the panel, discussed the chang-
ing role of  the ILO in influencing the global develop-
ment debate. He stated that the current international
environment is favourable to the ILOs policies on la-
bour standards and rights. The ILO is the only tripar-
tite international organization and it seeks to increase
co-operation between workers, employers and govern-
ments. The ILOs participation in other international
organizations may be seen as an indirect way of  giving
a voice to civil society. Both the IMF and the World
Bank have granted the ILO observer status on impor-
tant economic committees. Relations with the WTO
remain more contentious, although Lee envisaged
similar types of  co-operation when the controversial
labour-trade issue is resolved. He argued that policy
integration among institutionsand the ILOs recent
declaration committing all governments to the funda-
mental principles of  rights at workwill help ensure
that the international system is sensitive to a rights-
based development agenda.
Economic Policy Making
and Parliamentary Accountability
The last session, on economic policy making and par-
liamentary accountability, consisted of  two panels. The
first focused on Chile, Argentina, Benin and Malawi;
and the second on India, the Republic of  Korea and
Hungary. They examined changes in institutional ar-
rangements that are conducive to technocratic gov-
ernance, the role of  parliaments in influencing such
changes, and the ways governments have tried to co-
ordinate the choices of  parliamentary parties in mak-
ing economic policies.
Martin Chungong, who chaired both panels, high-
lighted the opportunities democratization offers par-
liaments to influence public policies. However, the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has realized that par-
liaments do not always use the powers granted them
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on legislative issues. Most of  the legislation processed
by parliaments emanates from the executive branch in
many countries. The imbalance exists at both national
and international levels.
Governments in new democracies often make decisions
at the international level and expect their parliaments to
simply rubber-stamp them. He argued that one reason
for the power imbalance may be related to the technical
nature of economic issues and the belief that diplo-
macy is the preserve of  the executive branch. The IPU
has been trying to redress this imbalance by insisting on
a greater role for parliaments in decision-making proc-
esses at both national and international levels; and in
supporting capacity building in new parliaments.
Chile, Argentina, Benin and Malawi
Verónica Montecinos discussed the rise, power and
changing character of  technocrats and democratic poli-
tics in Chile. She argued that technocrats have always
been important in policy making in Latin America, and
that democratization has not diminished their influ-
ence. Under democratization in Chile, technocrats have
expanded their domain of  influence beyond the eco-
nomic bureaucracy, to include new policy areas such
as labour relations, social services and diplomacy. Po-
litical parties and the Chilean Congress have also been
transformed by the greater weight assigned to techni-
cal criteria in policy debates and the increasing roles
played by professionals, especially economists, in these
institutions. There is thus a technocratic spillover
from the executive branch of  government to Congress
and other public bodies.
The rise of  technocrats in Chile precededand in some
accounts contributed tothe breakdown of  democ-
racy in the early 1970s. In anticipation of  the return to
civil rule, General Augusto Pinochets regime adopted
measures that further removed already insulated eco-
nomic institutions from political control. The demo-
cratic opposition developed its own technocratic
credentials to satisfy the demands of creditors and in-
vestors, who wanted credible commitments that eco-
nomic liberalization would not be reversed under
democratization. Recent efforts to stabilize the economy
and improve social programmes through a policy frame-
work of  concertation have been successful, but the
quality of  Chiles democracy is still debatable.
Javier Corrales examined the changing nature of  policy
making in Argentina. He argued that technocratic policy
making can enhance democratization by creating new
demands for effective legislative-executive relations.
Argentina is a good case for testing this hypothesis. In
the early period of  democratization, there was prefer-
ence for executive rule by decree to implement unpopu-
lar policies. However, many important lawssuch as
the currency convertibility law in 1991 and the law
governing the privatization of  state enterpriseswere
discussed in Parliament.
He highlighted the dramatic shift in the ratio of  laws to
decrees, with the former becoming more numerous as
the executive branch yearns for credibility and legiti-
macy. There is a huge increase in the number of  re-
ports explaining laws and clarifying policies to Congress.
This development has affected the behaviour of  the
opposition, which, to maintain its credibility, has been
forced to downplay ideology and concentrate on the
technical issues raised by government policies. He ar-
gued that this may increase the oppositions legitimacy
to the public and make it difficult for the government
to ignore the criticisms of  opposition parties.
The next presentations were on Benin and Malawi. In
Africa, the multilateral lending agencies, rather than fi-
nancial markets, play prominent roles in economic policy
making. Francis Akindes discussed the constraints on
democratization in Benin, one of only three African
countries that have witnessed an alternation of  power
through elections. Development in Benin is marked by
tensions between democratization and constraints as-
sociated with economic reforms and poverty.
Akindes argued that although the new Constitution of
Benin guarantees democracy, it privileges economic ef-
ficiency over democratic principles. For instance, cer-
tain provisions call for minimum legislative delays on
bills introduced by the executive branch. The law also
protects the executive branch from parliamentary ac-
tions that may be regarded as disruptive of  government
policies. He concluded that pressures from the Bretton
Woods institutions, which seek quick results for their
economic programmes, reinforce these constraints.
Wiseman Chijere Chirwa discussed the Malawi case. He
stated that low levels of  capacity in public institutions
and civil society in that country make it conducive to rule
by experts. He highlighted two contradictory trends: on
one hand, the core aspects of economic policy making are
insulated from the public and are dominated by techno-
crats in the reserve bank and ministry of  finance; on the
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other hand, the poverty alleviation programme attempts
to involve local communities in a participatory way.
Chirwa reported that since the 1999 elections there
have been extensive cross-postings of  personnel
among economic ministries. For example, the Reserve
Bank governor has become the finance minister; the
principal secretary in the Treasury has been made the
bank governor; and many officials in the Chamber of
Commerce now work in the Ministry of  Finance. Many
functions that were formerly associated with the Re-
serve Bank have been transferred to the Ministry of
Finance. The multilateral financial agencies have been
central to the process of  recruiting officials into these
economic ministries. Parliaments role in economic
policy making has been weak. He reported that one
constraint may be the vested interests of  parliamen-
tarians in the policies proposed by government. Some
parliamentarians, for instance, are beneficiaries of  the
governments privatization programme.
India, Republic of Korea and Hungary
The second panel discussed India, the Republic of  Ko-
rea and Hungary. India has an older democracy than the
other cases, and a vibrant civil society; it also boasts high
growth rates in recent years. Pratap Bhanu Mehta argued
that economic liberalization in the early 1990s diminished
rather than increased the role of  technocrats in India.
Unlike in Latin America, technocrats are barely repre-
sented in Indias Parliament; and the civil service, which
is wary of  externally recruited experts, is under firm po-
litical control. As a parliamentary democracy, all laws are
debated in Parliament. The economic reforms were suc-
cessful because bureaucrats and politicians collaborated
in developing compensatory schemes for losers.
Mehta reported that there has been a high turnover of
governments and electoral participation by the poor.
He hypothesized that high turnover may either constrain
politicians or encourage rent seeking. The Indian Par-
liament has become more representative than before.
However, increased party competition and high gov-
ernmental turnover have produced an ambiguous ef-
fect: growing consensus on economic reforms and a
slowdown of  reforms. Mehta concluded that the lack
of effective intraparty democracy has impeded account-
ability in the Indian Parliament.
Attila ` gh examined the Hungarian case. Hungary, like
India, is a parliamentary democracy. `gh argued that
the main objective of  Hungarian parties and policy-
making elites is to meet the conditions set by the EU
for membership. In this regard, the main pressures for
technocracy are not from the global financial markets,
but from regional blocs, which are, of  course, sensitive
to global competitive pressures.
`gh contended that Hungary has completed the transi-
tion phase of  democratization; the major problem now
is parliamentary performance. Comparatively, a large
number of  decisions have been made in Parliament, but
performance is still low. During the early phase of  de-
mocratization, parliamentarians knew what needed to
be done to turn Hungary from an authoritarian into a
parliamentary democracy. But the current situation is
not clear. In the quest for European integration, policy
content has been privileged over its method of  attain-
ment. There has also been some backlash in civil soci-
ety, which is making greater demands on government.
Doh C. Shin discussed the Republic of  Korea, which,
like Japan, developed a strong technocratic regime to
assist rapid industrialization. According to Shin, Korea
presents interesting insights on democratization, tech-
nocracy and changing policy choices under globaliza-
tion. It has experienced phenomenally high growth, active
state intervention in development, sustained pressures
for democratization, financial crisis that threatened to
undo its economic miracle, and IMF tutelage for reform.
Koreas technocratic regime suffered setbacks after de-
mocratization in the 1980s. Interest groups and Parlia-
ment increased their influence over how policies were
made. However, according to Shin, the financial crisis of
1997 led to a re-centralization of economic policy mak-
ing. New, powerful policy co-ordination bodies were cre-
ated that are not sufficiently accountable to Parliament.
Shin reported that under the current Constitution the
president enjoys more power than Parliament on eco-
nomic policy issues. For instance, although the assem-
bly is mandated to approve the governments budget, it
does not have the fiscal powers to either increase or
create new expenditure lines. The law also stipulates that
motions for budget amendments should be supported
by at least 50 members. Legislators have to lobby the
presidency to make funds available for their district
projects at the stage of  budget preparation.
Discussion
Much of  the discussion focused on the quality of  the
institutions in the new democracies. One person argued
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that the concept of  legislative power can be fuzzy, with-
out a yardstick to measure it. For instance, legislative
power may not only vary across countries, but may have
increased in some countries if the comparison is with
previous authoritarian regimes. Another participant
pointed out that institutional forms of  government
should be factored into the analysis of  legislative-
executive relations. For instance, it is generally assumed
that parliamentary systems encourage co-operation,
whereas presidential rule leads to gridlock.
Montecinos replied that the Chilean Congress is tradi-
tionally strong when compared to other Latin Ameri-
can countries. But the formal powers of  Congress in
economic policy making under the new Constitution
are limited. There is scope, however, for Parliament to
increase its influence through informal means. This has
happened through the election of economists as com-
mittee members on budgetary affairs. The current head
of  the parliamentary finance committee, for instance,
is a well-known former finance minister, Alejandro
Foxley. There are also many economists in Parliament
who have taken a keen interest in economic policy is-
sues. Montecinos believed that these economists can
engage the executive branch and officials of  the Bank
of  Chile in a constructive way, thus enhancing the in-
fluence of  Parliament on economic policy making. She
also stated that although Chile has a presidential sys-
tem, there is extensive co-operation between the execu-
tive branch and Parliament.
Some participants questioned the quality of  Argentinas
democracy. It was argued that the economic policies of
the Argentine government in the past 10 years have not
only been unpopular, but have been implemented in un-
democratic ways. Another person contended that eco-
nomic policies are often discussed by the government
and opposition figures behind closed doors, and that
Parliament is called upon merely to approve deals that
have been worked out in private. A third person argued
that what may be enhancing democracy in Argentina may
not be technocracy per se, but the self-restraint of  oppo-
sition parties. While technocracy may provide the con-
text in which self-restraint is exercised, the mechanism
providing the democratic outcome is self-restraint.
Corrales replied that his presentation did not seek to
paint a rosy picture of  democratization in Argentina.
Theoretically, technocratic policy-making styles can
improve or undermine executive-legislative relations.
In Argentina, legislators have become more involved
in economic policy making, but this does not mean
that democracy is now stronger than ever. Executive-
legislative relations are only a small part of  the demo-
cratic process.
The importance of  history and the stage of  economic
development in adopting policy reforms was also
noted. There may be a honeymoon period, allowing
officials to push through harsh reforms. Parliamen-
tarians do not always support populist policies, espe-
cially if  countries have just experienced hyperinflation.
If, as in Zambia, the transition is from a populist re-
gime, the new government may pursue conservative
economic policies. However, governments that are
formed during transition from a conservative regime
such as Hasting Bandas government in Malawimay
improve expenditure in the social sector.
Moreover, if  the transition is from a regime thought to
have been successful in managing an economy, as in
Chile, the new government may not want to undermine
that success. The view was also expressed that in Benin,
as in many francophone African countries, monetary
sovereignty has been surrendered to a regional central
bank. The role of  independent central banks is thus
not a matter for policy debate in these countries, which
generally have experienced low inflation rates. Chirwa
added that in many countries, transition has become
rather open ended.
A participant commented on the meritocratic character
of  the Indian civil service, and questioned whether it
should not be described as technocratic. Mehta replied
that the Indian public service does not have a speciali-
zation of  tasks, and does not recruit experts from out-
side the ministries. Although the civil servants are not
incompetent, policy outcomes are not commensurate
with targets. The reason has to do with the services
internal institutional complexity and costly incentive
structure: for instance, a number of  signatures are re-
quired even for small decisions.
Governance of  the Republic of  Koreas corporate struc-
ture and democracy was discussed. One participant ar-
gued that democracy does not always favour one type of
corporate structurethe modern capitalist type found
in Western democracies that separates owners from man-
agers; and that even in these countries there are varieties
of  corporate structures. He wondered why some schol-
ars should see Koreas chaebols (family-based conglomer-
ates) as incompatible with democracy. Shin responded
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that the chaebols discourage competition: the top 5 per
cent of  the chaebols account for 50 per cent of  Korean
gross domestic product. They also encourage corruption.
Attention was drawn to the disenchantment of  civil soci-
ety with Hungarys democratic institutions and the links
this may have with the governments determination to
meet the convergence criteria for EU membership. `gh
restated the low performance of  Hungarys democratic
institutions, which he associated with problems of  co-
ordination. Parliament produces a vast number of  laws
that must be amended because of  their poor quality.
The importance of policy implementation in techno-
cratic governance was emphasized. Public resistance, or
dilution of  targets, for instance, is often more effective
at the level of  implementation than when policies are
being made. It was stated that the policy agenda is likely
to be depoliticized when issues are technical or scien-
tific. Economic policy making tends to be technocratic
because economics is often seen as the most scientific
discipline in the social sciences. This raises the interest-
ing question of  what policy-making styles would look
like on matters that affect the natural sciences.
Strengthening
Democratic Institutions
Richard Josephs keynote address concluded the con-
ference, challenging the audience to transcend the con-
straints that neoliberalism imposes on economic policy
making and democratization. He argued that demo-
cratic institution building should be grounded on a
robust programme of  social development, which takes
seriously the goal of  overcoming human poverty.
Institution building should include the rebuilding, rather
than the scaling down, of  the state in crisis countries.
However, state-building projects should be anchored
to constitutional foundations if  they are not to degen-
erate into new forms of  authoritarianism. He called for
citizen self-rule, the protection of  civil rights, and the
broadest level of  participation in the deliberation of
public policies.
Joseph concluded his speech by outlining a research
agenda on democratization that will develop models
of  dynamic linkages between institutions, power and
social development in different sets of  countries at
both macro and micro levels. At the micro level, les-
sons can be drawn from the experience of  commu-
nity-based organizations in the fields of  governance
and development. He argued that this approach will
enable better understanding of  country and sector
performance, and assist decision makers and social
actors in crafting policies that will strengthen demo-
cratic institutions.
14
What Choices Do Democracies
Have in Globalizing Economies?
Technocratic Policy Making
and Democratization
Thursday, 27 April 2000
9:009:45 Opening Session
Welcome and Introduction  Thandika Mkandawire, UNRISD
Keynote Address: Globalization, Economic Policy Making and Democratization
      Sylvia Maxfield, Harvard University
9:4510:00 BREAK
10:0011:30 Session One  §  Independent Authorities and Democratic Accountability
Chairperson  Patricio Silva, Leiden University
The European Central Bank and Democratic Accountability  Robert Elgie
Bureaucratic Reform and Economic Policy Making in Japan  Junko Kato
Executive Agencies, New Public Management and Problems of  Accountability  Ole Therkildsen
11:3013:00 Session Two  §  Economic Reforms, Democratization and Social Policy
Chairperson  Stefanie Grant, Office of  the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)
Technocratic vs. Collaborative Regulation in Health Care: Reflections Based on
     the Tanzanian Experience  Maureen Mackintosh
Democratization, economic reforms and poverty alleviation  Abdul Raufu Mustapha
Technocratic policy making and social development in Latin America  Patricio Silva
13:0014:30 LUNCH
14:3016:15 Session Three  §  Civil Society and Technocratic Governance
Chairperson  Eddy Lee, International Labour Organization (ILO)
Technocratic Governance and Civil Society: The Multilateral Economic Organizations
      Robert OBrien
Labour Unions, Economic Policy Making and Social Pacts  Björn Beckman
Public Sector Workers, Union Rights and Economic Policy Reform  Alan Leather
16:1516:30 BREAK
16:3018:00 Session Four  §  Economic Policy Making and Parliamentary Accountability
Chairperson  Martin Chungong, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
Chile  Verónica Montecinos
Argentina  Javier Corrales
Benin  Francis Akindes
Malawi  Wiseman Chijere Chirwa
Friday, 28 April 2000
9:3011:00 Session Four (contd)  §  Economic Policy Making and Parliamentary Accountability
Chairperson  Martin Chungong, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
India  Pratap Bhanu Mehta
Republic of  Korea  Doh C. Shin
Hungary  Attila `gh
11:0011:15 BREAK
11:1511:45 Closing Session
Chairperson  Thandika Mkandawire, UNRISD
Keynote Address: Strengthening Democratic Institutions in the Era of  Globalization
      Richard Joseph, Emory University
Agenda
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